Singapore has not expressed reluctance to join treaties with investor-state arbitration clauses, nor has Singapore given any notice or indicated any intention to terminate any of its bilateral investment treaties (BITs) or similar agreements. Singapore is generally supportive of and committed to the development of the global investor-state arbitration system.

Notably, the EU-Singapore Free Trade Agreement (FTA), which came into force on 21 November 2019 (and has been described by the Court of Justice of the European Union as one of the first “new generation” EU FTAs), contains innovative investment dispute resolution provisions establishing both a permanent Investment Tribunal of first instance and an appellate tribunal for appeals.

In August 2026, Singapore announced its intention to put forward a bid to host the Multilateral Investment Tribunal (MIT) that is currently being negotiated at the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Working Group III, as a part of its work on investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS)reforms. The MIT will comprise a bench of independent, elected members serving fixed terms who will hear international investment disputes arising between investors and states. To enhance the accessibility of the MIT to its end users, Singapore is also prepared to support an assistance fund for developing and least developed countries to access the MIT’s functions, and provide translation and transcription services, as part of its bid to host the MIT.

In the same month, the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) also officially launched its first staffed office outside its headquarters in Washington, DC, in Singapore. The ICSID Singapore office serves as ICSID’s regional hub for Asia and the Pacific and enables ICSID to serve the region’s needs in investment dispute prevention, management and resolution. This is in addition to the establishment of the Singapore office of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in 2018 and the recent expansion of the PCA Singapore office in September 2025, to more than double its previous size to support its next phase of growth in the Asia-Pacific region.

The Singapore courts have also consistently adopted a policy of minimal curial intervention in arbitration-related court proceedings, including investor-state arbitration. In Lao Holdings NV and another v Government of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic [2022] SGCA(I) 9, the Singapore Court of Appeal upheld the minimum curial intervention approach and held that “a setting aside application is not an opportunity for an applicant to take a second bite at the cherry”.

Singapore is a party to the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (“New York Convention”). Singapore acceded to the New York Convention on 21 August 1986, and it came into force on 19 November 1986. Singapore ratified the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (“ICSID Convention”) on 14 October 1968.

Singapore’s extensive treaty network overwhelmingly provides for investor-state arbitration as the primary dispute resolution mechanism, typically offering investors recourse to ad hoc arbitration under the UNCITRAL Rules and/or arbitration under the rules of ICSID and/or its Additional Facility Rules.

At the time of writing, Singapore has not been a respondent state in any investor-state arbitrations. There have been notable cases in which Singaporean investors have been involved in investor-state arbitrations as claimants. These cases have been brought before tribunals under the ICSID Rules and UNCITRAL Rules, and/or have been administered by the PCA. Notable examples include Kenon Holdings Ltd and IC Power Ltd v Republic of Peru (ICSID Case No. ARB/19/19), AsiaPhos Limited and Norwest Chemicals Pte Limited v People’s Republic of China (ICSID Case No. ADM/21/1) and Goh Chin Soon v People’s Republic of China (PCA Case No. 2021-30), which are discussed below. There are no known instances of Singapore investors pursuing investment treaty claims through domestic litigation as an alternative to investor-state arbitration.

There has, however, been significant litigation in the Singapore courts in relation to investor-state arbitration including applications for review of an investor-state arbitral tribunal’s jurisdictional rulings, and the setting aside and/or enforcement of investor-state arbitral awards. To this end, the Singapore courts have developed a substantial body of ISDS-related jurisprudence with landmark decisions such as Sanum Investments v Government of Lao People’s Democratic Republic [2016] 5 SLR 536, Swissbourgh Diamond Mines (Pty) Ltd and others v Kingdom of Lesotho [2018] SGCA 81, The Republic of India vDeutsche Telekom AG [2024] 1 SLR 56, Republic of Korea v Mason Capital LP [2025] 4 SLR 308, DNZ v DOA and another [2026] SGHC(I) 1 and TheRussian Federation v Veteran Petroleum Ltd and others [2026] SGCA (I) 5.

Besides arbitration, Singapore has also actively developed a complementary suite of dispute resolution services for investment-treaty claims. The Singapore International Commercial Court (SICC), established in 2015, provides a neutral forum for cross-border commercial disputes, including setting-aside and enforcement applications arising from investor-state arbitrations. Singapore was also instrumental in the adoption of the United Nations Convention on International Settlement Agreements Resulting from Mediation, which entered into force on 12 September 2020 and enables the cross-border enforcement of mediated settlement agreements. The Singapore International Mediation Centre is active in providing the necessary institutional support for mediation-related processes.

Mining, natural resources and energy have featured prominently among publicly known investor-state arbitrations brought by Singapore investors. The cases discussed below concern investments located overseas and held through Singapore-incorporated entities. This pattern is consistent with Singapore’s role as an international business and investment hub, through which companies hold and manage investments in other jurisdictions.

• Four cases filed by the same Singapore-incorporated claimant, Zeph Investments,againstthe Commonwealth of Australia (Zeph Investments v Australia (I) (PCA Case No. 2023-40); Zeph Investments v Australia (II) (PCA Case No. 2023-67); Zeph Investments v Australia (III) (PCA Case No. 2024-23); and Zeph Investments v Australia (IV) (PCA Case No. 2024-48)) involved investments in iron ore, coal and related energy projects. These cases arose from, among other things, decisions by the Australian government refusing mining leases and development approvals on the basis of, among other things, climate change considerations.
• AsiaPhos Limited and Norwest Chemicals Pte Limited v People’s Republic of China (ICSID Case No. ADM/21/1) involved investments in phosphate mines in Sichuan, China, with claims arising from alleged government directives to vacate and cease mining operations, and non-renewal of mining and exploration licences.
• PNG Sustainable Development Program Ltd v Independent State of Papua New Guinea (ICSID Case No. ARB/13/33) concerned mining interests in the Ok Tedi mine in Papua New Guinea.
• Kenon Holdings Ltd and IC Power Ltd v Republic of Peru (ICSID Case No. ARB/19/19) involved investments in local electric energy companies in Peru and arose from a regulatory agency’s withdrawal of exclusive rights and changes to transmission line calculations, which benefited state-owned electric companies to the investor’s detriment.

The prominence of these sectors should be viewed in the context of Singapore’s role as a base for international mining, commodities and energy businesses. Its geographical proximity and connectivity to resource-rich markets, access to finance and professional services, and stable legal and regulatory environment make it an attractive location for international operations. Investments held through Singapore-incorporated entities nevertheless remain exposed to regulatory and political developments in the states where the underlying projects are located. Capital intensity, long project lifecycles and dependence on government licences and approvals are characteristics of these sectors, and can make changes in host state policies particularly consequential, including changes driven by environmental and climate objectives.

Notable investor-state arbitrations involving Singapore investors include the following:

• PNG Sustainable Development Program Ltd v Independent State of Papua New Guinea (ICSID Case No. ARB/13/33)
1. Facts:PNG Sustainable Development Program Ltd (PNGSDP), a company incorporated under the laws of Singapore, owned a majority shareholding (63.4%) in Ok Tedi Mining Ltd (OTML), a Papua New Guinean company that held a special mining lease over the Ok Tedi open pit copper and gold mine in the Star Mountains of the Western Province of Papua New Guinea. PNGSDP had been incorporated in 2001 as the vehicle to which BHP Minerals Holdings Pty Ltd divested its shares in OTML, with the objective of applying the income from the mine to advance a programme of sustainable development for the benefit of the people of Papua New Guinea. In September 2013, the Papua New Guinea Parliament enacted the Mining (Ok Tedi Tenth Supplemental Agreement) Act 2013, which purported to cancel PNGSDP’s shares in OTML, and effectively nationalised the mine. PNGSDP commenced ICSID arbitration, claiming that the enactment of this law amounted to an unlawful expropriation of its investment.
2. Key legal principles:A critical jurisdictional issue was raised, namely whether the state had provided its “consent in writing” to ICSID arbitration as required under Article 25 of the ICSID Convention. The tribunal examined whether two domestic statutes could constitute a standing offer by the state to submit investment disputes to ICSID. The case also raised a question of whether a company incorporated for public development purposes (rather than as a conventional profit-seeking investor) could qualify as an “investor” under the ICSID Convention.
3. Outcome:The tribunal unanimously dismissed the claim, for lack of jurisdiction, finding that the state had not provided its written consent to ICSID arbitration. Neither of the domestic laws relied upon by PNGSDP constituted consent to ICSID jurisdiction. The decision is significant for its analysis of the requirements for state consent to ICSID arbitration, and for its treatment of the boundaries between domestic investment promotion laws and consent to international arbitration.
• PACC Offshore Services Holdings Ltd v United Mexican States (ICSID Case No. UNCT/18/5)
1. Facts:PACC Offshore Services Holdings Ltd (POSH), a company incorporated in Singapore, commenced arbitration against Mexico under the Mexico-Singapore BIT and the UNCITRAL Rules 2010. POSH had invested in vessel charter operations for Pemex (Mexico’s state-owned oil company). Beginning in 2014, Mexico took actions that prevented POSH from continuing to charter those vessels to Pemex, thereby allegedly destroying POSH’s investments.
2. Key legal principles:The case concerned whether Mexico’s actions constituted a breach of its obligations under Chapter II of the Mexico-Singapore BIT, including fair and equitable treatment (FET), and protection against expropriation. The tribunal also considered jurisdictional issues relating to the scope of the investment and the timeliness of the claim.
3. Outcome:The tribunal found in favour of the Singapore investor and awarded damages of USD6.7 million, plus interest.
• Kenon Holdings Ltd and IC Power Ltd v Republic of Peru (ICSID Case No. ARB/19/19)
1. Facts: Two Singapore-incorporated holding companies brought claims against Peru under the Peru-Singapore FTA 2008, alleging that Peru’s withdrawal of exclusive rights granted to the claimants’ local subsidiary to provide a secondary frequency regulation service, and changes to the methodology for calculating transmission line tolls for energy generators, benefited state-owned electricity companies to the claimants’ detriment.
2. Key legal principles: The case involved claims of expropriation, denial of FET and discriminatory treatment in the energy regulation sector. The central issues included whether the regulatory agency’s withdrawal of exclusive rights and unilateral changes to toll calculation methodology constituted breaches of the investment chapter of the Peru-Singapore FTA.
3. Outcome: The tribunal ruled in favour of the investors, awarding USD110.7 million in damages, with costs and interest. This remains the most significant monetary award in an investment treaty case brought by a Singaporean investor.
• AsiaPhos Limited and Norwest Chemicals Pte Limited v People’s Republic of China (ICSID Case No. ADM/21/1)
1. Facts: Two Singapore-incorporated companies brought claims against the PRC under the PRC-Singapore BIT, alleging expropriation of their phosphate mines in Sichuan province through government directives to vacate and cease mining operations and the non-renewal of mining and exploration licences.
2. Key legal principles: The case involved claims based on unfair and inequitable treatment, failure to afford protection and security to the claimants’ investment, and breach of the umbrella clause under the BIT. The analysis primarily engaged with two critical issues: (a) the scope of the arbitration clause in the PRC-Singapore BIT, which allowed arbitration only for disputes on “the amount of compensation for expropriation”; and (b) whether the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) clause could be used to expand the scope of the arbitration clause to encompass claims beyond those which have been expressly consented to. The majority of the tribunal held that the narrow arbitration clause did not cover claims for indirect expropriation or other treaty breaches, and that the MFN clause could not be invoked to widen the tribunal’s jurisdiction.
3. Outcome: The tribunal found that it had no jurisdiction over the claims.
• Goh Chin Soon v People’s Republic of China (PCA Case No. 2021-30)
1. Facts: Mr Goh Chin Soon, a Singaporean real estate developer, invested from the early 1990s in three real estate projects in the Laoshan District of Qingdao. Beginning in 2004, the Qingdao authorities investigated Mr Goh for alleged contractual fraud. Bankruptcy proceedings, the liquidation of project assets and his arrest followed, and Mr Goh alleged that his assets were then expropriated and assigned to companies connected with the officials concerned. Mr Goh commenced arbitration against China under the China-Singapore BIT, which later proceeded under the UNCITRAL Rules. He claimed up to USD19.4 billion in damages.
2. Key legal principles: The case involved claims based on expropriation and breach of FET. One of the key issues involved is the scope of the arbitration clause. Article 13(3) of the China-Singapore BIT allows arbitration only of disputes “involving the amount of compensation resulting from expropriation”. The tribunal read the expropriation provision (Article 6) together with the dispute settlement clause, applying Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. It also relied on the fork-in-the-road element of the clause. On that basis, the tribunal held that its jurisdiction extended to deciding whether an expropriation had occurred and whether it was lawful. This departs from the majority approach in AsiaPhos v China on the same BIT. Further, the tribunal held that the MFN clause could not be used to extend its jurisdiction to FET claims, consistent with the approach in AsiaPhos v China.
3. Outcome: The tribunal found that China had expropriated Mr Goh’s investments in breach of the BIT, awarding only USD71 million in damages to Mr Goh, against a claim of around USD19.4 billion.

At the time of writing, Singapore has not been a respondent state in any investor-state arbitrations.

As of September 2026, there are 45 BITs and investment guarantee agreements which have been ratified by Singapore (see here).

Singapore has concluded BITs with the following counterparties: Myanmar, Kazakhstan, Indonesia, Rwanda, Kenya, Qatar, Nigeria, Iran, Côte d’Ivoire, the United Arab Emirates, the Russian Federation, Mexico, Kuwait, Libya, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Oman, Slovakia, Ukraine, Saudi Arabia, Bangladesh, Jordan, Bahrain, Bulgaria, Uzbekistan, Belarus, Mauritius, Slovenia, Latvia, Hungary, Egypt, Lao PDR, Cambodia, Mongolia, Czech Republic, Pakistan, Poland, Vietnam, BLEU (Belgium-Luxembourg Economic Union), Switzerland, France, the United Kingdom, Germany and the Netherlands.

Singapore has signed BITs with the following countries, which are not yet in force: Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Burkina Faso and Colombia.

Singapore does not use a model BIT. The format and language of Singapore’s BITs generally follow the same format and language of the world’s leading capital-exporting states, and include provisions concerning expropriation, FET, full protection and security (FPS) and MFN treatment (details of which are discussed below).

As of September 2026, Singapore is a party to 29 FTAs, of which 21 contain investment chapters. Singapore is not part of a customs union, trade structure or supranational legal order comparable to the EU. Singapore is a member state of ASEAN, which provides a multilateral framework through which several investment agreements have been concluded with various parties including Australia, New Zealand, China, Hong Kong, India, Japan and Korea.

Singapore’s most significant FTAs with investment chapters include the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), the ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement (ACIA), and FTAs with Australia, China, India, Japan, the Republic of Korea, New Zealand, Peru, the United Kingdom, the United States, Turkey, Costa Rica, Panama, Sri Lanka and the Pacific Alliance countries.

The FTAs with investment chapters provide substantive protections including FET and FPS, protection against expropriation, MFN and national treatment, and investment dispute resolution mechanisms permitting investors to bring claims directly against host states through international arbitration (typically under the ICSID or UNCITRAL Rules):

• Expropriation: The definition of expropriation in Singapore’s investment agreements typically includes both direct and indirect expropriation (ie, “measures having effect equivalent to nationalisation or expropriation”). As an example, Annexure 2 of the ACIA expressly distinguishes between direct and indirect expropriation. It provides that “non-discriminatory measures of a member state that are designed and applied to protect legitimate public welfare objectives, such as public health, safety and the environment, do not constitute indirect expropriation”.
• FET and FPS: The FET and FPS provisions are similar across most of Singapore’s investment agreements, typically requiring that investments be “accorded fair and equitable treatment” and “enjoy full protection and security”. The FET provisions in recent multilateral treaties are more prescriptive. For example, the ACIA outlines what constitutes FET and clarifies that denial of justice would amount to a breach of the FET standard.
• MFN treatment: Most of Singapore’s investment agreements include an MFN clause. The inclusion of an MFN clause can have the effect of extending standards of treatment in an investment agreement to investors from the states that are not privy to the investment agreement, which ensures that the contracting parties treat investors from the other state party at least as favourably as they treat third-party investors. A notable exception is the EU-Singapore Investment Protection Agreement (EUSIPA), which does not contain an MFN provision.
• Transparency: The EUSIPA and the Singapore Australia Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA) reflect Singapore’s latest approach to transparency. The EUSIPA (Article 3.16) adopts enhanced transparency standards in ISDS disputes, such as all hearings will be open to the public and decisions of the tribunal will be publicly available.
• Corruption: Most of Singapore’s investment agreements do not contain provisions expressly addressing corruption. A rare exception is the Pacific Alliance-Singapore FTA (Article 8.20), which provides that objections may be raised on the ground that an investment was made through fraud, misrepresentation, concealment, corruption or conduct amounting to an abuse of process. Many treaties concluded by Singapore contain provisions requiring the investment to be made in accordance with the national laws of the host state, which may be relied upon by a state party to argue that a corrupt investment was not made in accordance with its laws.

Singapore does not publish interpretative aids with regard to investment treaties. Diplomatic notes and protocols are typically published together with the text of the treaty (see, as examples, the Singapore-PRC BIT and the Germany-Singapore BIT).

Singapore does not have a national investment law.

Foreign investments are principally governed by sector-specific laws and regulators. For instance, the registration of companies in Singapore is administered by the Accounting and Corporate Regulatory Authority, with certain sectors subject to additional licensing, consent or approval requirements imposed by the relevant sector-specific regulators. The Economic Development Board, established under the Economic Development Board Act 1961, also plays an important role in promoting and facilitating foreign investment in Singapore.

While Singapore maintains an open investment regime, foreign investment is subject to certain sector-specific restrictions and regulatory requirements, including in the areas of broadcasting and media, banking and financial services, telecommunications and land ownership. In addition, the Significant Investments Review Act 2024 (SIRA) establishes a national investment review regime for significant investments in certain designated entities. SIRA empowers the government to regulate changes in ownership and control of such designated entities and take measures, in certain circumstances, where an entity acts contrary to Singapore’s national security interests.

Singapore state bodies and agencies are known to enter into commercial contracts with foreign investors that provide for commercial arbitration of disputes (including under institutional rules). Such clauses typically cover contractual disputes rather than treaty-based claims. As commercial arbitration proceedings are generally confidential, there is limited publicly available information on such contractual arrangements and the arbitration proceedings brought pursuant to them.

The protection offered by contractual arbitration clauses is different from that provided by investment treaties, and the types of disputes covered by contractual arbitration clauses are different from those covered under investment treaties. Contractual arbitration clauses typically cover breaches of the contract and are governed by the contract’s applicable laws and available only to the contracting parties. Investment treaties, by contrast, provide substantive international law protections, including FET and FPS, protection against expropriation, MFN and national treatment, and are available to any qualifying investor under the relevant treaty, regardless of whether that entity has a direct contractual relationship with the state or state body and/or agency.

The most frequently cited complaints by Singaporean investors pertain to expropriation (both direct and indirect), breach of FET obligations, breach of MFN obligations, and breach of contractual commitments elevated through umbrella clauses. This is consistent with the broader global pattern in investor-state arbitration.

There are no limits to the parties’ autonomy to choose arbitrators, save that if the number of arbitrators is not specified by the parties, the default is a single arbitrator (see Section 9 of the Singapore International Arbitration Act 1994 (IAA)).

Singapore law provides default procedures for the appointment of arbitrators where the parties’ agreed appointment mechanism fails. Pursuant to Section 3(1) of the IAA, the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (“Model Law”) has force of law in Singapore. Article 11(4) of the Model Law read with Article 6 of the Model Law and Section 8 of the IAA provides that if the parties’ agreed appointment procedure fails, any party may request the President of the Court of Arbitration of the Singapore International Arbitration Centre (SIAC and “SIAC Court”) (or such other persons appointed by the Chief Justice of Singapore) to “take necessary measures”.

In appointing an arbitrator, the President of the SIAC Court “shall have due regard to any qualifications required of the arbitrator by the agreement of parties and to such considerations as are likely to secure the appointment of an independent and impartial arbitrator and, in case of a sole or third arbitrator, shall take into account as well the advisability of appointing an arbitrator of a nationality other than those of the parties” (see Article 11(5) of the Model Law).

Under Section 9B of the IAA, where there are multiple claimants, they must jointly agree on the appointment of an arbitrator and inform the respondent(s) of the same when they send their request for the dispute to be referred to arbitration; similarly, where there are multiple respondents, they must jointly agree on the appointment of their arbitrator within 30 days after the date of receipt of the request for the dispute to be referred to arbitration. If the relevant group cannot agree on the appointment of the arbitrator and/or fails to inform the other party or parties of such appointment within the stipulated timelines, any party may request the President of the SIAC Court to appoint all three arbitrators and designate any one of the arbitrators as the presiding arbitrator.

Singapore courts cannot intervene directly in the selection or appointment of arbitrators but may hear a challenge to an arbitrator or the validity of the tribunal’s constitution (as discussed in 4.4 Challenge of Removal of Arbitrators).

Singapore courts may intervene in challenges or removal of arbitrators.

Pursuant to Article 13 of the Model Law, parties are free to agree on a procedure for challenging an arbitrator. If there is no such agreed procedure, the challenge must first be brought before the tribunal. Where the tribunal rejects the challenge, an application may be made to the General Division of the Singapore High Court for final determination, and which decision shall be subject to no appeal. An application can also be made to the General Division to challenge the tribunal’s decision on its own jurisdiction under section 10(3) of the IAA, on the basis that there are defects in the procedure for the constitution of the tribunal.

Singapore law imposes express requirements of independence, impartiality and disclosure on arbitrators. Article 12(1) of the Model Law requires a prospective arbitrator to disclose any circumstances likely to give rise to justifiable doubts as to their impartiality or independence. This is an obligation which continues throughout the arbitral proceedings, which requires disclosure without delay of any such circumstances, arising or becoming known to the arbitrator in the course of the arbitration. An arbitrator may be challenged where circumstances exist giving rise to justifiable doubts as to their impartiality or independence, or where the arbitrator does not possess the requisite qualifications agreed by the parties.

The 2025 Arbitration Rules of the Singapore International Arbitration Centre (“SIAC Rules 2025”) impose similar obligations. Under Rule 20 of the SIAC Rules 2025, an arbitrator must remain independent and impartial throughout the arbitration, and must sign a Statement of Acceptance, Independence, Impartiality and Availability. A prospective arbitrator is required to disclose circumstances that may give rise to justifiable doubts as to their impartiality or independence, and the duty to disclose continues throughout the arbitration.

The Singapore courts have recognised the IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration as a useful guide in determining whether an arbitrator has complied with their disclosure obligations in respect of potential conflicts of interest (see BYL v BYN [2020] SGHC(I) 6). Further, the Singapore courts apply the “reasonable suspicion” test in assessing allegations of apparent bias, which requires the court to consider whether “a reasonable member of the public could harbour a reasonable suspicion of bias even though the court itself thought there was no real danger of this on the facts” (see Re Shankar Alan s/o Anant Kulkarni [2007] 1 SLR(R) 85). This was reaffirmed by the Singapore Court of Appeal in BOI v BOJ [2018] SGCA 61, where it was observed that apparent bias is assessed objectively from the perspective of a fair-minded, informed observer. The observer must have an evidence-based, reasonable suspicion that such bias exists, and not a fanciful or unduly suspicious belief.

An arbitral tribunal seated in Singapore has broad powers to grant interim reliefs and make protective orders under Section 12 of the IAA. These powers are available during the arbitral proceedings and are intended to preserve the subject matter of the dispute, protect the parties’ positions and ensure that any eventual award is not rendered ineffectual.

Under Section 12(1) of the IAA, the tribunal may, among other things, order security for costs, require the discovery of documents or the provision of evidence, order the preservation, interim custody or sale of property forming part of the subject matter of the dispute, direct the preservation and interim custody of evidence and enforce confidentiality obligations. The tribunal may also make orders for securing the amount in dispute, including measures to prevent the dissipation of assets or other conduct that could render a subsequent award ineffective. Such interim reliefs granted by an arbitral tribunal are binding and are enforceable in the same manner as an order of the court.

The primary power to grant interim measures rests with the arbitral tribunal under Section 12 of the IAA.

The Singapore courts may grant interim reliefs in support of arbitration under Section 12A of the IAA, regardless of whether the arbitration is seated in or outside of Singapore. These include orders for preservation, interim custody or sale of property, preservation and interim custody of evidence, securing the amount in dispute, preventing the dissipation of assets so as not to render any eventual award ineffectual, and granting interim injunctions or other interim measures. However, this is only in cases where the tribunal or any institution vested with the necessary powers has no power or is unable for the time being to act effectively. Further, the court will also only exercise its power in cases of urgency; if the case is not one of urgency, the court will only exercise its power with the permission of the arbitral tribunal or the written agreement of the parties.

The court may also enforce interim measures granted by an arbitral tribunal. Under Section 12(6) of the IAA, an order or direction made by a tribunal during an arbitration may, with the leave of the court, be enforced in the same manner as an order of the court. The court may accordingly enter judgment in accordance with the terms of the tribunal’s order or direction.

However, it should be noted that an order or direction made by a tribunal is not an award on the substance of the dispute and is therefore not subject to the same setting-aside and/or enforcement framework applicable to final arbitral awards. This distinction has been emphasised in DLS v DLT [2025] SGHC 61, where the High Court held that an order or direction made under Section 12 is not susceptible to setting aside under Section 24 of the IAA or Article 34 of the Model Law.

Arbitral tribunals and courts can order security for costs. Under Section 12(1)(a) of the IAA, an arbitral tribunal has the express power to make an order or direction requiring a party to provide security for costs. The Singapore courts may also grant an order for security for costs under Section 12A of the IAA, subject to the limitations mentioned in 5.2 Role of Domestic Courts.

Third-party funding of investor-state claims is permitted in Singapore. In 2017, Singapore amended its laws to allow third-party funding for international arbitration proceedings, as well as court or mediation proceedings connected with international arbitration. This includes investor-state arbitrations.

In 2021, the scope of claims for which third-party funding is permitted was expanded to include:

• (a) arbitration proceedings;
• (b) court proceedings arising from or connected with domestic arbitration proceedings;
• (c) proceedings commenced in the SICC, for as long as the proceedings remain in the SICC;
• (d) appeal proceedings arising from any decision made in the proceedings in (c) above; and
• (e) mediation proceedings in relation to the above.

In DTH and another v DTF and others [2026] SGHC(I) 5, the SICC dismissed an application to set aside a costs award arising from a Singapore-seated arbitration. The applicants, who had prevailed in the underlying arbitration, were awarded a sum of USD14.7 million. They had funded the arbitration through a litigation funding agreement and sought to recover approximately USD14.6 million in third-party funding costs, which the tribunal’s majority declined to award. The applicants then brought a challenge before the Singapore courts against the costs award on two grounds: (i) that it conflicted with Singapore’s public policy of access to justice under Article 34(2)(b)(ii) of the Model Law; and (ii) that the tribunal departed from the agreed arbitral procedure. The ultimate question before the SICC was whether the tribunal’s refusal to award the applicants their third-party funding costs was liable to be set aside for being contrary to Singapore’s public policy. The SICC answered this question in the negative, holding that the applicants’ formulation of public policy was impermissibly narrow and that the applicants’ inability to recover their full costs did not meet the high “shock the conscience” threshold required to set aside an award for being contrary to public policy. 

While the SICC observed that the amendments to Singapore’s legislation permitting third-party funding did not expressly permit recovery of third-party funding costs, it did not express a view as to whether the tribunal was right to refuse the applicants’ claim for third-party funding costs. As such, it is arguable that it remains an open question whether and how an arbitral tribunal may award a successful party its costs of third-party funding in a Singapore-seated arbitration.

Under Rule 49A of the Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules 2015, a legal practitioner is required to disclose to the court or tribunal, and to every other party, the existence of a third-party funding contract and the identity and address of the funder. The disclosure must be made at the commencement of the proceedings, where the funding agreement pre-dates the proceedings, or as soon as practicable after the agreement is entered into.

Rule 38 of the SIAC Rules 2025 requires a party to disclose the existence of any third-party funding agreement and the funder’s identity and contact details in its arbitration notice or response, or as soon as practicable after entering into a funding agreement. The tribunal may order further disclosure, including details of the funder’s interest in the outcome and whether the funder has undertaken adverse-costs liability. The rule also prohibits parties from entering into a funding arrangement after the constitution of the tribunal, if that may create a conflict with a member of the tribunal. The existence of third-party funding does not, by itself, establish that security for costs should be ordered. Rule 38.5 of the SIAC Rules 2025 specifically provides that the existence or disclosure of funding is not, on its own, an indication of the funded party’s financial status.

Based on publicly available materials, we have not identified any reported Singapore court judgments or published arbitral awards in Singapore-seated arbitrations that directly address the relevance of third-party funding to an application for security for costs.

There are no general pre-arbitration procedural requirements applicable to investor-state arbitration under Singapore law. Any requirements for pre-arbitration procedure principally depend on the applicable investment treaty or instrument.

Singapore courts have recognised that compliance with treaty-specific preconditions to arbitration may be required where the state has made compliance a condition of its consent to arbitration. In Swissbourgh Diamond Mines (Pty) Ltd and others v Kingdom of Lesotho [2018] SGCA 81 (“Swissbourgh”), the Court of Appeal held that the investors’ failure to comply with the treaty’s requirement to exhaust local remedies meant that the condition attached to Lesotho’s consent to arbitrate had not been satisfied, and accordingly the tribunal lacked jurisdiction.

In the context of international commercial arbitration, recent Singapore court decisions have considered whether non-compliance with preconditions to arbitration, including negotiation requirements, goes to admissibility or jurisdiction. In DRO v DRP [2025] SGHC 255, the Court held that compliance with the requirement for pre-arbitration negotiations goes to admissibility rather than jurisdiction. A tribunal’s ruling on whether such a requirement has been complied with is therefore not subject to the court’s review on jurisdictional grounds. In DSQ v DSR [2026] SGHC 67, the Court endorsed the same approach but clarified that this is a general proposition, as there may be cases where the general rules could be displaced and a precondition to arbitration is a matter of jurisdiction rather than admissibility. This includes circumstances where there is clear and unequivocal contractual language providing that compliance with a pre-arbitration condition is amenable to review by the court. It distinguished Swissbourgh on the basis that the requirement to exhaust local remedies concerned the state’s consent to arbitration. Applying the general rule, the Court held that compliance with the requirement to refer disputes to a Dispute Adjudication Board prior to arbitration under the parties’ FIDIC-based contract was a matter going to admissibility rather than jurisdiction. The tribunal’s ruling on that issue was therefore not subject to review by the Court. DSQ is currently under appeal.

Under Singapore law, confidentiality is regarded as an implied obligation in arbitration. Sections 22 and 23 of the IAA provide for confidentiality in arbitration-related proceedings. Section 12 of the IAA empowers the tribunals to make orders or directions to enforce confidentiality obligations. In Myanma Yaung Chi Oo Co Ltd v Win Win Nu and another [2003] SGHC 124, the Singapore High Court confirmed that parties to international commercial disputes can generally expect confidentiality, even in the absence of an express confidentiality agreement.

In AAY and others v AAZ [2011] 1 SLR 1093, the Singapore High Court further affirmed that “as a matter of law, an obligation of confidentiality is to be implied in arbitration proceedings due to the private nature of such proceedings”. This was characterised as a “general principle or doctrine of arbitration law developed through the common law”. Confidentiality is, however, not absolute. The Court also identified circumstances in which disclosure may be permissible, which included: (i) party consent; (ii) court order or leave of the court; (iii) protection of legitimate interests; (iv) the interests of justice; and (v) public interest.

However, where substantial information about an arbitration is already publicly available and confidentiality is substantially lost, there may no longer be any utility in maintaining confidentiality. In Republic of India v Deutsche Telekom AG [2023] SGCA(l) 4, the Court of Appeal refused India’s application for privacy orders in respect of enforcement proceedings because the confidentiality of the underlying arbitration had substantially been lost. The awards were available online, and information identifying the parties and the outcome had been disclosed through media coverage and social media posts and in foreign court proceedings. The Court explained that, where the confidentiality of the underlying arbitration had been lost, open justice weighs strongly in favour of lifting the privacy protections afforded to related court proceedings.

Treaty provisions may expressly balance transparency with the protection of confidential information. Article 29 of Chapter 8 of SAFTA requires the respondent state to make specified documents publicly available, including notices of arbitration, written submissions, hearing minutes or transcripts where available, and the tribunal’s orders, decisions and awards. Hearings must also be open to the public. These requirements are subject to protections for protected information, including redaction of documents and, where necessary, closing portions of hearings.

Annex 8 of the EUSIPA, which has been signed but has not yet entered into force, provides for a similar transparency framework. It provides for publication of specified documents through a repository administered by the UNCITRAL Secretariat, including pleadings, expert reports, hearing minutes or transcripts where available, and the tribunal’s orders, decisions and awards. It also provides for public hearings and permits third-person written submissions with the tribunal’s permission. Confidential or protected information is safeguarded through redaction and other measures, while publication may be restricted or delayed to protect the integrity of the proceedings. When exercising its discretion under the Annex 8, the tribunal must consider both the public interest in transparency and the disputing parties’ interest in fair and efficient dispute resolution.

Under Singapore law, an arbitral tribunal has broad powers as to the remedies it may award, subject to the terms of the parties’ arbitration agreement and the applicable substantive law. Section 12(5)(a) of the IAA broadly provides that a tribunal “may award any remedy or relief that could have been ordered by the General Division of the High Court, if the dispute had been brought as civil proceedings before the Court”.

The common forms of reliefs and remedies include monetary awards, orders for specific performance, injunctions and declaratory reliefs.

Singapore law does not prescribe a specific methodology for quantifying damages. The approach towards valuation is determined by the applicable treaty, general principles of international law, and the tribunal’s discretion. Three principal methodologies are typically employed:

• Discounted cash flow (DCF): The DCF method is a commonly invoked approach. It values an asset as the sum of the present values of the future cash flows stemming from ownership, projected over a forecast period and discounted back to the present using an appropriate discount rate.
• Market-based approach: This approach determines value by reference to comparable market transactions. In Kiri Industries v Senda International Capital Ltd and Dystar Global Holdings [2022] SGCA(I) 5, the Court of Appeal considered the enterprise values of comparable listed companies and transaction multiples in acquisitions of similar companies as acceptable “valid reference points”.
• Cost-based approaches: Cost-based methods value the investment by reference to the costs of recreating or replacing the investment, including its book value, replacement cost and liquidation value. These are generally more appropriate for loss-making investments or where the investment has an independent realisable value, rather than for investments that are going concerns.

Parties in arbitrations seated in Singapore are entitled to recover interest as well as costs associated with the arbitration.

In relation to interest, Section 20 of the IAA empowers an arbitral tribunal to award simple or compound interest on any sum awarded, including damages and costs. The tribunal has discretion to determine the applicable interest rate, the period for which interest is payable, and whether interest should accrue before the award (pre-award interest) or after the award (post-award interest). Section 20(3) of the IAA provides as a default that unless otherwise directed in the award, any sum directed to be paid will carry interest as from the date of the award and at the same rate as a Singapore judgment debt (which, as of the time of writing, is 5.33%).

As for costs, Section 21 of the IAA provides that any costs directed by an award to be paid are, unless the award otherwise directs, assessable by the Registrar of SIAC.

The general principle followed in Singapore-seated arbitrations is that the costs follow the event (ie, the successful party is ordinarily entitled to recover a significant portion of its reasonable costs). Singapore courts have consistently upheld this approach, while acknowledging that the discretion to award costs must be exercised judicially.

There is no statutory or other provision under Singapore law which requires an aggrieved investor bringing an investor-state claim or arbitration against a state to mitigate its losses. Whether an aggrieved investor is under such a duty depends on, among other things, the relevant treaty or instrument, general principles of international law and investor-state arbitration, and any other laws applicable to the dispute, claim or arbitration.

The IAA governs enforcement of awards in international arbitrations seated in Singapore as well as foreign-seated arbitrations. The Arbitration Act 2001 (AA) applies to any arbitration seated in Singapore, and where Part II of the IAA does not apply (ie, domestic arbitrations). The Arbitration (International Investment Disputes) Act 1968 (AIIDA) implements the ICSID Convention and sets out the procedure for the recognition and enforcement of ICSID awards in Singapore.

For ICSID awards (which include “any decision interpreting, reversing or annulling an award, being a decision pursuant to the [ICSID] Convention, and any decision as to costs which under the [ICSID] Convention is to form part of the award”), any person seeking recognition or enforcement of the award is entitled to have the award registered in the General Division of the High Court. The Singapore courts have in NextEra Energy Global Holdings BV v Kingdom of Spain [2026] SGHC 43 (“NextEra Energy”) confirmed that the regime for setting aside and refusal of enforcement and recognition of an arbitral award under the Model Law and the New York Convention does not apply to the registration of an ICSID award, which is the product of a self-contained system.

For Singapore-seated awards, parties can apply to the General Division for the award to be recognised and enforced in the same manner as a judgment or order of the General Division (see Section 19 of the IAA). The application is made without notice and supported by an affidavit: (1) exhibiting the arbitration agreement or any record of the content of the arbitration agreement and the original award or, in either case, a copy thereof; (2) stating the name and the usual or last known place of residence or business of the applicant and the person against whom it is sought to enforce the award, respectively; and (3) as the case may require, stating either that the award has not been complied with or the extent to which it has not been complied with at the date of the application (see O 48 r 6 of the Rules of Court 2021). An application to enforce an award may also be brought before the SICC, which has jurisdiction over proceedings relating to international arbitrations that the General Division may hear under the IAA (see Section 18D(2)(a) of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1969 and O 23 r 3 and 10 of the SICC Rules 2021). A similar procedure applies in enforcement proceedings before the SICC; ie, the application is made without notice, though it is supported by a witness statement, rather than an affidavit. The required content of the witness statement is identical to that of the affidavit filed in support of an enforcement application before the General Division.

Foreign awards made in a country that is a Contracting State within the meaning of the New York Convention may also be enforced using a similar procedure before the General Division or the SICC (see Section 29 of the IAA and O 23 r 10 of the SICC Rules 2021).

A foreign award made in a jurisdiction that is not a signatory to the New York Convention can be enforced pursuant to the procedure for the enforcement of a domestic arbitral award as set out in Section 46(3) of the AA. The procedure is similar to that for enforcing a Singapore-seated international arbitral award and/or a foreign award made in a New York Convention country.

Where an award has been set aside by the court at the seat, the Singapore courts may refuse to enforce the award under Section 31(2)(f) of the IAA. In PT First Media TBK v Astria Nusantara International BVand others [2013] SGCA 57, the Court of Appeal observed that where an award has been set aside by a foreign seat court, the enforcement court may be reluctant to recognise or enforce the award, as the contemplated erga omnes effect of a successful application to set aside would lead to the conclusion that there is no award to enforce. The Court of Appeal subsequently noted in The Republic of India v Deutsche Telekom AG [2024] 1 SLR 56 that a seat court’s decision to set aside an award may also be given effect through transnational issue estoppel. Accordingly, if an arbitral award has been set aside at the seat of arbitration, it is unlikely that the Singapore court will enforce the award.

Under Section 31(5) of the IAA (giving effect to Article VI of the New York Convention), the Singapore courts do not automatically suspend enforcement when set-aside proceedings are pending at the seat. As observed by the General Division of the Singapore High Court in Astar Trading Pte Ltd v Olan Global Agri Pte Ltd [2025] SGHC 5, “Section 31(5) of the IAA confers a wide and open-textured statutory discretion on the enforcement court, which takes a multi-factorial approach to the exercise of its discretion, weighing in the balance factors of the case in favour of or against the adjournment and striking a fair balance by coming down on the side of an outcome that is the most just or least unjust”. The court may consider factors such as: (i) the bona fides of the setting aside application and whether it is merely a delaying tactic; (ii) the strength of the merits of the setting aside application; (iii) whether the adjournment will render it more difficult to enforce the award; and (iv) the likely length of an adjournment and the consequent prejudice that may be caused. Section 31(5) of the IAA further provides that the party seeking to enforce the award may also apply for “suitable security” if enforcement is to be adjourned.

As for immunity claims, under Section 11 of the State Immunity Act 1979 (SIA), a state that has agreed in writing to submit a dispute to arbitration is not immune from related proceedings in the Singapore courts, subject to any contrary provision in the arbitration agreement. In The Russian Federation v Veteran Petroleum Ltd and others [2026] SGCA (I) 5 (“Hulley”), the Singapore Court of Appeal held that Russia was precluded by transnational issue estoppel from re-litigating whether it had agreed to arbitrate the relevant disputes under the Energy Charter Treaty. That question had already been determined by the Dutch appellate courts. The arbitration exception in Section 11 of the SIA applied and Russia’s claim to immunity from the Singapore enforcement proceedings failed.

For ICSID awards, the judgment in NextEra Energy also confirms the relevance of the submission exception under Section 4 of the SIA. The Court held that, by acceding to the ICSID Convention, Spain had submitted to the jurisdiction of the courts of other Contracting States for proceedings to recognise and enforce ICSID awards.

Immunity from execution against state property is a separate matter. Under Section 15 of the SIA, state property is generally protected from execution, subject to exceptions including the state’s written consent and property used or intended for use for commercial purposes. An agreement to arbitrate does not, by itself, remove that protection.

The courts in Singapore may refuse enforcement of a foreign award under Sections 31(2) and 31(4) of the IAA, on the following grounds:

• The arbitration agreement is invalid.
• A party to the arbitration agreement was under some incapacity.
• The party making the setting aside application was not given proper notice of the appointment of an arbitrator or of the arbitral proceedings, or was otherwise unable to present its case.
• The award deals with a dispute not contemplated by or not falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration, or contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration, provided that, if the decisions on matters submitted to arbitration can be separated from those not submitted, only that part of the award which contains decisions on matters not submitted to arbitration may be set aside.
• The composition of the tribunal or the arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the parties’ agreement or the law of the country where the arbitration took place.
• The dispute was not arbitrable under Singapore law.
• Enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public policy of Singapore.

For ICSID awards, the AIIDA does not provide any basis for resisting recognition and enforcement of the award outside of the annulment framework contained in the ICSID Convention.

Singapore courts apply a narrow standard when considering whether to refuse enforcement of a foreign arbitral award on public policy grounds. The Court of Appeal in AJU v AJT [2011] SGCA 41 observed that there is no difference between the concept of public policy under Article 34(2)(b) of the Model Law (for Singapore-seated awards) and Section 31(4)(b) of the IAA (for foreign awards). The prevailing approach of the courts where setting aside of a Singapore-seated award or enforcement of a foreign arbitral award is resisted on public policy grounds is that the objection must involve either exceptional circumstances which would justify the court refusing to enforce the award or a violation of “the most basic notions of morality and justice”. 

Singapore generally adopts a restrictive approach to state immunity; ie, a state cannot claim immunity from adjudication on disputes arising from its commercial transactions or from execution against property used for a commercial purpose. As discussed above, the Singapore Court of Appeal in Hulley affirmed that a foreign state cannot assert sovereign immunity under the SIA where it has agreed in writing to arbitrate. Immunity from execution against a state’s property is provided for in Section 15(2) of the SIA. The commercial exception to this aspect of state immunity is found in Section 15(4), which provides that a foreign state’s immunity from execution against its property does not apply to “property which is for the time being in use or intended for use for commercial purposes”.

In respect of recovery against state assets, the Singapore Court of Appeal in The State-Owned Company Yugoimport SDPR v Westacre Investments Inc [2016] SGCA 51 held that funds beneficially owned by the state and held by the subsidiary of a state-owned company on a bare trust could be attached and applied towards satisfaction of the judgment obtained by the judgment creditor.

As discussed in 9.2 Approach of the Courts, Section 15(4) of the SIA provides for a commercial exception to state immunity for state assets which are in use or intended for use for commercial purposes. Such state assets can be identified by undertaking searches against publicly available resources, including through property searches, financial statements and court records, as well as engaging and working with asset-tracing investigators.

Singapore courts generally uphold the separate legal personality of companies. The Singapore Court of Appeal in Goh Chan Peng and others v Beyonics Technology Ltd and others [2017] SGCA 40 (“Beyonics”) emphasised that “the doctrine of separate legal personality is not displaced simply by virtue of the fact that the companies in question are, as members of a group, organised as a single economic unit”. In Manuchar Steel Hong Kong Ltd v Star Pacific Line Pte Ltd [2014] 4 SLR 832, the High Court rejected an attempt to support enforcement of an award against a third-party related company on the grounds that the award debtor and the third party were part of a “single economic entity”. The Court emphasised that an arbitral award cannot ordinarily impose enforceable obligations on a stranger to the arbitration agreement.

Singapore courts adopt a restrictive and exceptional approach to piercing the corporate veil. In Tjong Very Sumito and others v Chan Sing En and others [2012] SGHC 125, the High Court observed that there were generally two justifications for such piercing: (i) where the evidence shows that the company was not in fact a separate entity; and (ii) where the corporate form had been abused to further an improper purpose. The court in Beyonics also observed that piercing may be justified in case of an abuse of the corporate form or if it is necessary to give effect to a legislative provision.

In respect of state-owned entities, Singapore courts have not had the occasion to extensively consider the circumstances in which a state-owned enterprise may be regarded as the alter ego of a state. Guidance may be drawn from decisions in other common-law jurisdictions, such as the Privy Council’s decision in La Generale des Carrieres et Mines v FG Hemisphere Associates LLC [2012] UKPC 27 (“FG Hemisphere”).

In FG Hemisphere, the Privy Council held that there is a strong presumption that a state-owned entity is a separate entity, where it has a separate judicial status, especially where it has been “formed by the state for what are on the face of it commercial or industry purposes, with its own management and budget”. This presumption would only be displaced in “quite extreme circumstances”, where “despite its juridical personality, [the entity has] no effective separate existence”. To assess this, the court would look at (among other things) “the relevant constitutional arrangements, as applied in practice, as well as the state’s control exercised over the entity and of the entity’s activities and functions” and determine whether these factors “justify the conclusion that the affairs of the entity and the state were so closely intertwined and confused that the entity could not properly be regarded for any significant purpose as distinct from the state and vice versa”.